

CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE

"...promoting the transition to and consolidation of democratic regimes throughout the world."

Strategic Plan, 1997-2002

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I. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

1. The idea of democracy has been inextricably linked to the national identity of the United States. Even during the most isolationist periods in our early history, our relatively young country was seen as a shining beacon to individuals and families seeking individual freedoms. Today the world is a much smaller place, and its problems confront us in more immediate ways. The United States is vigorously engaged in all corners of the globe, acting as a force for peace and prosperity; expanding the global community of democracies is a key objective of U.S. foreign policy.

2. As the primary channel for U.S. foreign assistance in the developing world, USAID has taken a leading role in promoting and consolidating democracy worldwide. Expanding democracy improves prospects and expands individual opportunity for prosperity and improved well-being, thus contributing to the more traditional goals of the Agency.

3. In 1994, the Center for Democracy and Governance was created to provide strategic and programmatic direction for USAID's democracy and governance program. Providing technical leadership and field support, the Center is a reliable and effective partner of USAID missions worldwide. The last three years have yielded many useful lessons, allowing the Center to continuously improve its services and products. This Strategic Plan specifies objectives and sets priorities for the Center's operation over the next five years.

A. Democracy and the National Interest of the United States

4. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, the demise of the Soviet Union, and the passing of communism as a threat to nations around the world, U.S. foreign policy moved into a new era. No longer does the United States have one clearly defined adversary, and thus no one measure by which to calibrate foreign policy worldwide. While they may be more diffuse, dangers and threats to peace, stability, and economic prosperity persist in this new era. The challenge now is to recognize and understand multiple and constantly-shifting sources of peril and to address complex and inter-linked causes of unrest such as ethnic strife, environmental degradation, rapid population growth, and poor economic performance. In the words of President Clinton, "Never has American leadership been more essential--to navigate the shoals of the world's new dangers and to capitalize on its opportunities."¹

Expanding the Community of Sustainable Democracies

5. One of these opportunities is to promote principles of democratic governance and provide technical assistance to newly formed democracies. The United States government works to encourage democracy in developing nations throughout the world partly on the intrinsic value which rests in the ideals of liberty, personal and civic freedom, and government of, for, and by the people: ideals on which the United States was founded and which continue to gird the social and political life of our nation. As Madeleine Albright stated to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in January 1997, "We will continue to promote and advocate democracy because we know that democracy is a parent to peace, and that the American

¹The White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996): i.

constitution remains the most revolutionary and inspiring source of change in the world." ²

6. This commitment goes beyond ideology. As articulated in the Clinton Administration's *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*:

...The core of our strategy is to help democracy and free-markets expand and survive in other places where we have the strongest security concerns and where we can make the greatest difference. This is not a democratic crusade; it is a pragmatic commitment to see freedom take hold where that will help us most. Thus, we must target our effort to assist states that assist our strategic interest.... We must focus our efforts where we have most leverage. And our efforts must be demand driven--they must focus on nations whose people are pushing for reform or have already secured it.³

7. By promoting and assisting the growth of democracy, the United States also supports the emergence and establishment of polities that will become better trade partners and more stable governments. Smooth transitions of power will reduce the deadly risk of nuclear weapons falling to the control of irrational agents. Democracies also facilitate trust in their government might prevent hundreds of thousands of individuals from fleeing their homelands and contributing to destabilizing and costly refugee flows, anarchy and failed states, and the spread of disease and epidemics of catastrophic proportion.

Global Trends

8. Profound political, economic, and cultural changes are occurring throughout the world. Many are positive changes that offer grounds for tempered hope. Along with the flourishing of democratic and free market reforms, the end of the Cold War has brought an increase in tensions and conflict along ethnic, religious, and cultural lines. Ethnic struggles in Bosnia and continued conflict in Central Africa are evidence of the destructive potential of ethnic hatred.

9. Broad numbers of individuals do not yet live in conditions of freedom. In its *Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties*, Freedom House reports that 61 percent of countries in the world are democracies. This is a marked improvement from 42 percent reported only a decade ago.⁴ What this indicates, however, is that many democracies are young and as of yet untested. This is particularly true in the New Independent States and in Central and Eastern Europe. Here democracy has gained a foot-hold; whether or not it will flourish is a separate question. The Soviet Empire is gone. In its place are the fledgling democracies of Central and Eastern Europe and the struggling former members of the Soviet Union in Central Asia. Russia has experienced successful presidential elections; the Baltics have seen continuing democratic progress. After years of communist imposition, however, state and non-state actors

U.S. Senate, U.S. Secretary of State Designate Madeleine Albright speaking to the Committee on Foreign Relations, 105th Congress, 1st Session (January 8, 1997).

The White House: 33.

U.S. Agency for International Development, *Congressional Presentation Fiscal Year 1998* (Washington, DC: USAID, 1997): 17.

are struggling to translate the concept of freedom into social, political and economic realities. This process is proving to be extremely delicate. The turmoil in Albania, instigated by a lack of economic knowledge, stands as a recent example.

10. The demise of the bipolar, Cold War conflict has provoked similar changes in Latin America and in Africa. In Latin America, Cuba remains the only completely non-democratic country. Other countries of this region are in various stages of democratic transition: some fragile, others relatively established. The attempted coup in Paraguay serves as a poignant reminder that the possibility of military takeovers can not yet be excluded. Primary areas of concern are: rising crime rates, increases in public corruption, and tension between civil liberties and public security. An example of the latter is when citizens hesitate to testify in a court of law for fear of retribution.

11. Africa presents a critical opportunity for international involvement. Many African countries are moving toward economic reform and political liberalization and out of political and social conflict as demonstrated in Rwanda, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. With large populations and significant economic potential, Nigeria, South Africa, and Kenya are pivotal in the effort toward establishing stability in sub-Saharan Africa. Zaire is equally pivotal, owing to its size, central location and imminent political change and uncertainty. Mozambique and Angola, having emerged from protracted civil wars, are now presented with the challenge of reconstructing devastated economies. Political stability is essential if economic progress is to take place in these countries. Uganda, Ethiopia, and Eritrea seem to have achieved a level of political stability not found in countries like Liberia, Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, Sudan, and Zaire. Finally, the backsliding experienced by democracy in Kenya, Zambia, and Zimbabwe reminds us that democratic institutions must grow and be tested over time. Peaceful and sustained transfers of power represent a critical indicator of rooted democratic government. Significant challenges to democratic consolidation in Africa include: the lack of political will on the part of some governments to implement meaningful reforms, co-optation of members of the judiciary and legislature by the executive branch, and fragmented political parties manipulated along ethnic lines.

12. From both economic and strategic perspectives, Asia and the Near East are regions that offer compelling motivations for involvement in the democracy/governance arena. On the Asian continent, India, Sri Lanka, and the Philippines have demonstrated the viability of democratic development. Countries including Nepal, Bangladesh, and Mongolia have recently moved to implement democratic forms of government. Indonesia's regime, however, has not done so and continues to carry out oppressive policies. The same is true of Burma and Laos. India and Indonesia are countries in which a stable middle class continues to grow. Economically, the entire region is ripe with opportunity. Trade with the United States has grown on an annual basis, and the potential for new markets is tremendous for both sides. Likewise, this is an optimal stage for the further development of a vibrant civil society. The tenuous balance of power in the Middle East requires continuous attention. Egypt is deeply involved with the ongoing peace initiatives involving Israel, yet neither its political nor its economic policies have been liberalized. The Egyptian media, along with private and public interest groups, are heavily censored, and a large portion of the economy is still under state control.

13. The opportunities and need for support of democracy and governance are great. Transitions are underway around the world, and fragile democratic systems need to be consolidated. While the impetus toward democratic reform is and should be indigenous in nature, other government and donor agencies can play an important strategic role by supporting policies and organizations promoting such reform.

Other Donors

14. The United States is the leading proponent of democratic governance among donor countries, and USAID is the leading and most influential donor agency in an expanding field of bilateral and multilateral donors now working in this field of development. Donor collaboration is important for purposes of program complementarity and economies of scale, and for maintenance of consistent pressure for reform and assurance of adequate levels of support.

15. Among the multilateral donors, the major players in governance support are the World Bank and the United Nations Development Program. Both emphasize the links between "good governance" and economic development in matters of DG programming. Their emphasis on governance is one that draws heavily on public management, information and communication theory, and the idea of encouraging government structures that manage resources efficiently. The Inter-American Development Bank and the Asia Development Bank are becoming increasingly involved in legal reform.

16. Bilateral donors often emphasize "democracy" as well as "governance," basing strategy rationale on the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, along with other international documents and accords. The Canadian International Development Agency, the British Overseas Development Agency, and the governments of Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, and Japan are a few of the many entities involved and working in partnership with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), voluntary associations, religious organizations, and local and national governments to promote democratic development around the world. The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development provides a forum for consensus-building among donors on principles relating to democracy, human rights, good governance, public participation and excess military expenditures. DAC position papers reflect a donor consensus consistent with the U.S. perspective that achievements in economic and social development are not sustainable without accountable, representative, and participatory political institutions.

B. U.S. Government Policy and Implementing Agencies

17. President Clinton has made the promotion of democratic governance a focal point of his administration. In his words:

...One of the most gratifying and encouraging developments of the past 15 years is the explosion in the number of states moving away from repressive government and toward democracy. Since the success of many of those experiments is by no means assured, our strategy of enlargement [of the community of democratic and free-market nations] must focus on the consolidation of those regimes and the broadening of their commitment to democracy. At the same time, we seek to increase respect for fundamental human rights in all states and encourage an evolution to

democracy where that is possible...⁵

The promotion of democracy serves vital U.S. national interests. Democratic governments are more likely to advocate and observe international laws and to experience the kind of long-term stability which leads to sustained development, economic growth and international trade. Countries which are experiencing economic growth and actively engaged in trading relationships are less likely to engage in acts of war.

18. In addition, the growing phenomenon of failed states and the challenge of crisis prevention is a profound area of concern for the United States. Weak or non existent democratic institutions are a clear and common factor of nations that have succumbed to crisis. It has occurred in the former communist countries and in the least developed countries. These countries are too often unable to avoid escalating violence due to a lack of institutional capacity. The United States has a compelling national interest in preventing and averting crises before they occur. When potential crises erupt into genuine emergencies, mobilization of the U.S. military and the provision of humanitarian assistance become complex and costly, and economic interests usually suffer. Successful development and transitions out of closed systems vastly improve the capabilities of a country to manage division and conflict.

19. Numerous U.S. Government agencies are involved in promoting democratic initiatives on many fronts. These include the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Department of Defense (DOD), as well as USAID. Coordination among these agencies occurs at all levels, and is best exemplified by the "country team" setting of the overseas missions.

20. Since the 1970s, the U.S. Department of State has been investigating, tracking and reporting on human rights issues and practices worldwide. Each year since 1977, the Department has submitted increasingly detailed and reliable country reports on foreign governments' human rights practices to the U.S. Congress. These reports are researched and written by officers at U.S. embassies worldwide, using various sources including the local media, human rights organizations, labor unions, and religious groups. In 1994, the Clinton Administration further emphasized and defined the role of human rights and democracy by expanding the Department's Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs to become the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, thus "reflecting both a broader sweep and a more focused approach to the interlocking issues of human rights, workers rights, and democracy." ⁶ The State Department has focused its diplomatic efforts around the world to support the transition to and consolidation of democracy, speaking out within countries as well as in multilateral fora. Economic Support Funds are allocated by the State Department to support key countries undergoing a political transition. In recent years, State has become involved in decision-making for the programming of USAID funds appropriated through the Support for Eastern European Democracy (SEED) Act and the Freedom Support Act.

The White House: 32.

U.S. Department of State, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1996* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 1997): 1.

21. USIA promotes freedom of press and information worldwide. Its direct broadcast networks deliver high quality programming designed to provide a comprehensive view of American culture, politics, and foreign policy. The networks include the Voice of America TV, the WorldNet Television and Film Service, Radio and TV Marti, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, and Radio Free Asia. USIA is appropriated funding for exchanges, and to provide limited technical assistance and training of journalists in developing countries.

22. The U.S. Department of Justice offers technical assistance and participant training programs for police investigators and prosecutors through its Office of Professional Development and Training (OPDAT) and the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), both of which are partially funded by USAID. Through these programs, participants are exposed to U.S. law enforcement and trained in basic police procedures, forensic medicine and forensic testing of evidence, as well as the functional areas related to developing administrative and management systems.

23. The Department of Defense, through the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), trains foreign military leaders and civilians in military and democratic governance issues. Since 1976, the International Military Education Training Program (IMET) has brought officers to the U.S. Naval Post-Graduate School in Monterrey for training, alongside U.S. military officers. Trainees have typically been drawn from developing countries. In Fiscal Year 1991 the U.S. Congress broadened the program to focus on issues, such as civil-military relations, human rights, military justice, and defense resource management. The George Marshall Center in Germany trains foreign military and government officials on issues related to democracy, the rule of law, and arms control each year. The U.S. Department of Defense is, of course, also the ultimate guarantor behind the United States commitment to protect friendly democratic nations and their democratic systems. A draft report on U.S. defense strategy cites the need for expanding the capabilities and flexibility of U.S. forces to better handle peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance. Recent examples where U.S. armed forces have been called upon include Haiti and Bosnia. USAID is active in both places to facilitate transitions to effective self-governance and democratic rule.

24. In addition to U.S. government agencies, several quasi-governmental and non-governmental implementing organizations are working to promote democracy in developing countries. The National Endowment for Democracy (NED), for example, is a non-profit institution which is funded directly by the U.S. Congress to promote democracy overseas. NED supports grass-roots organizations through discrete activities of short duration and limited purpose. Its aims include representative political parties, a free-market economy, independent trade unions, and a free press.

25. Two of NED's "core grantees," the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI) are affiliated with the U.S. Democratic Party and U.S. Republican Party, respectively. The labor institutes affiliated with the AFL-CIO also receive a significant level of NED and USAID funds. Each of these organizations receives support to help promote, maintain, and strengthen democratic institutions in developing countries.

C. USAID's Strategy and The Center for Democracy and Governance

26. Upon taking office in 1993, the Clinton Administration initiated deliberate efforts to include consideration of political development issues in USAID sustainable development strategies, and to enhance capacity to implement technically-sound democracy programs. In 1994, USAID identified "building sustainable democracies" as one of four Agency goals, as documented in *Strategies for Sustainable Development*.⁷ The Global Bureau's Center for Democracy and Governance and the Bureau for Humanitarian Response's Office for Transition Initiatives were simultaneously created to guide quality democracy programming and respond rapidly to changing political circumstances.

27. Democracy and governance programming has since become an integral component of USAID's support for sustainable development. Democratization not only supports U.S. foreign policy goals, but facilitates informed participation, public sector accountability, and the protection of human rights. Success in the other core areas of USAID's sustainable development program (broad-based economic growth, population/health, environmental protection, and crisis/disaster prevention and response) is inextricably linked to democratization and good governance.

28. Currently, 70 percent of an existing 93 field missions have a strategic objective related to democracy and governance.⁸ USAID democracy programs are developed in response to a given country's specific circumstances. At the same time, Agency guidance suggests specific programming interventions depending on whether a country is in a pre-transition, post-transition, post-conflict, or consolidation circumstance. While transition situations often require rapid responses, the conduct of a comprehensive assessment of the political situation in a country precedes implementation of long-term democracy programs.

Agency DG Strategic Objectives

29. Establishing democratic institutions, free and open markets, an informed and educated populace, a vibrant civil society, and a relationship between state and society that encourages pluralism, participation, and peaceful conflict resolution—all of these contribute to the goal of building sustainable democracies. The Agency's Strategic Framework, adopted in 1995, identifies four strategic objectives in the democracy sector: a) strengthened rule of law and respect for human rights; b) more genuine and competitive political processes; c) increased development of a politically active civil society; and d) more transparent and accountable government institutions. Progress toward all four objectives is necessary to achieve sustainable democracy.

U.S. Agency for International Development, *Strategies for Sustainable Development* (Washington, D.C.: USAID, 1994): 17+.

Recent decisions to restructure overseas missions and to more sharply focus program initiatives, along with budget-driven staffing reductions, represent both a challenge and opportunity for the Center. The number of "full" missions is proposed to be reduced to 25-30 countries worldwide. "Limited" missions will depend increasingly on Global Bureau expertise for program development and delivery.

G/DG Role

30. The Global Bureau's Center for Democracy and Governance (G/DG) was established in 1994 as a focal point for realizing the Agency's principal goal of building sustainable democracies. The Center is responsible for improving the overall effectiveness of Agency programming in democracy and governance. G/DG plays an important role in developing and disseminating technical expertise to ensure that democracy programs are of the highest possible quality. The Center develops new strategies and methodologies and recruits and trains democracy officers.

31. In addition, the Center reviews and provides input for all Agency strategic plans; provides assistance to the PPC Bureau toward developing a performance monitoring system for DG objectives; participates in reviews of field missions' performance; and takes part in reviews of Agency budget allocations and performance with respect to the overarching DG goal. The Center provides services to field missions, other USAID operating units, and other USG agencies (as appropriate) through cadres of specialists and experienced officers. It manages umbrella contracts and oversees implementing mechanisms to support field needs. The Center is increasingly tasked with managing DG activities in countries with no or very limited USAID field presence.

32. The Center recognizes the field missions as USAID's primary means for the delivery of sustainable development assistance. The Center's role is to support these missions in designing and implementing effective democracy programs. It offers missions easy-to-use, relevant mechanisms to provide expertise on demand. In countries where USAID has little or no presence, e.g., in countries undergoing political transition, the Center may manage activities directly. Many such programs are funded with ESF funds allocated by the Department of State to respond to a critical foreign policy need. In these cases, the Center coordinates with USAID's relevant geographic offices, the Office for Transition Initiatives, and State/DRL. Within the Global Bureau, the increasing emphasis on important cross-cutting policy initiatives has led to G/DG's increased collaboration with G/ENV in the area of local government, with G/EG in the areas of legal reform (commercial law) and anti-corruption, and with G/WID in the area of women's political and legal rights.

Technical Leadership

33. The Center is responsible for identifying, enhancing, and developing the tools, methods, and methodologies that USAID and others can use to support democratic development. Technical leadership includes researching, analyzing, disseminating, and applying the "lessons learned" from current democracy programs; serving as a technical "home base" for all DG officers in USAID; recruiting and selecting new democracy officers; and providing training, career advice, and support to DG officers in assignments and evaluations. Within the sector, technical knowledge is needed not only in how to approach the overall strategy towards DG programming, but in the sub-sectors of DG represented by the four SSOs.

Field Support

34. The Center supports the development, implementation, and evaluation of mission DG programs and strategies. Center staff provide on-site technical assistance. Additionally, the Center has developed a comprehensive range of IQCs, cooperative agreements, and grants which missions may access for short, medium, and long-term assistance. These implementing mechanisms allow missions to tap the technical expertise of the nation's democratic institutions and NGOs. The activities for which missions seek support through these mechanisms may be part of an integrated DG portfolio or wholly unanticipated (e.g., results of rapid programming developed in response to significant host country developments).

Management of Global and Non-Presence Country Activities

35. The Center contributes to the success of USAID's overarching DG goal through the direct management of global DG activities, as well as DG activities in non-presence countries. Global activities are developed to supplement and support mission-led country initiatives. Global activities provide opportunities for networking, cross-fertilization, economies-of-scale, and other efficiencies unavailable to geographic bureaus and bilateral missions. The core features of these activities are supported through Center resources; supplemental measures of disproportionate benefit to any one country or geographic region typically require the added support of other organizational unit resources.

36. The Center's management of activities in non-presence countries occurs particularly in collaboration with State/DRL and the coordinated programming of ESF resources, and the close involvement of relevant USAID geographic bureau and USAID/BHR personnel. Consistent with Agency strategy, post-crisis country interventions (e.g. Liberia, Angola, and prospectively Zaire) are typically of a rapid-response nature and involve activities of high visibility in support of the peace initiative. In transition situations (e.g. Mongolia, Yemen, Pakistan, and prospectively, China and Burma), the emphasis is foundation-building for longer-term institutional development.

II. STRATEGIC SUPPORT OBJECTIVES

Overview

37. The Center's strategic framework, in matrix form, is attached as Annex 1. Center objectives align with the four objectives supporting the overarching Agency goal of "building sustainable democracies." While results are described through the four objectives, the Center's main goal is to contribute to results in the democracy and governance sector as a whole, especially through the development of DG assessment and strategic methodologies, and integration of programs between the sub-sectors. The DG sub-sectors are necessary--but linked--elements of creating sustainable democracies. In order for USAID programs to be effective, each sub-sector needs to be addressed.

38. The Center's objectives are best defined as "strategic support objectives," given the nature of the "value added" by Center services and products toward the Agency's larger democracy goal. The contributions of the Center's technical leadership, field support, and program management are most meaningfully assessed in the country context in which they are applied. Each of the Center's products (e.g., an improved methodology, prototype, strategy, or global activity output) is usually intended to facilitate or enhance the accomplishment of other USAID operating unit objectives. The outcome, or "intermediate result," leads to substantive advancement toward the Agency goal when applied in concert with other unit resources.

39. The Center, working in collaboration with other USAID organizational units, aims to address the DG system as a whole. Toward this end, in addition to working on overall strategic frameworks, the Center works to ensure that: 1) legal systems operate more effectively to embody democratic principles and protect human rights; 2) political processes more effectively reflect the will of an informed citizenry; 3) informed citizens' groups effectively contribute to more responsive government; and 4) national and local government institutions more openly and effectively perform public responsibilities. These strategic support objectives (SSOs) are typically referenced as the Center's objectives in the areas of rule of law, electoral and political processes, civil society, and governance.

A. Rule of Law (SSO 1)

40. The term "Rule of Law" (ROL) embodies the basic principles of equal treatment of all people before the law, fairness, and both constitutional and actual guarantees of basic human rights. A predictable legal system with fair, transparent, and effective judicial institutions is essential to the protection of citizens against the arbitrary use of state authority and lawless acts of both organizations and individuals. In many states with weak or nascent democratic traditions, existing laws are not equitable or equitably applied; judicial independence is compromised; individual and minority rights are not truly guaranteed; and institutions have not yet developed the capacity to administer existing laws. Weak legal institutions endanger democratic reform and sustainable development in developing countries. Without the rule of law, a state lacks (a) the legal framework necessary for civil society to flourish; (b) adequate checks on the executive and legislative branches of government; and (c) necessary legal foundations for free and fair electoral and political processes. Beyond the DG sector, the accomplishment of other USAID goals relies on effective rule of law. Civil and commercial codes that respect private property and contracts are key ingredients for the development of market-based economies. The Center's efforts to strengthen legal systems, in conjunction with the activities of USAID missions, fall under four inter-connected priority areas: supporting legal reform, improving the administration of justice (AOJ), increasing citizens' access to justice, and promoting respect for human rights.

Legal Reform

41. The foundation for a society's acceptance of the rule of law begins with a fair and reliable legal system. Oftentimes a country's move toward sustainable development requires major legal reform. This involves the drafting and revision of constitutions, codes, laws, decrees, and regulations, as well as the compilation and organization of sets of laws and codes. Changes in statutory, regulatory, and judicial organizations also constitute legal reforms. Without establishing a legal framework, the rule of law is not possible. An effectively functioning justice system can provide a legitimate check to excessive state power, establish sound economic rules and procedures, and avoid the arbitrary governmental policies reflective of authoritarian rule.

42. In conjunction with USAID missions, as well as other governmental and non-governmental entities, the Center works with host governments and non-state counterparts to institute sound legal reforms through technical leadership and field support. Targeted areas of reform include drafting and implementing constitutions and criminal, civil and commercial codes; and drafting other relevant legislation.

Administration of Justice (AOJ)

43. Effective, equitable, and transparent administration of justice is necessary to enjoy the benefits of progressive legal and structural reform. To ensure that the judiciary is a fully independent and equal branch of the government, AOJ begins with strengthening the judiciary through greater administrative and financial autonomy, merit selection of judges, and staff professionalization. Additionally, AOJ focuses on the daily management of the judicial system to ensure accountability, improve the capacity for gathering and analyzing data, reduce delays, and increase court efficiency. Not limited to courtroom functions, AOJ encompasses the entire justice system. The prompt, fair, impartial, and competent investigation and prosecution of crimes and the provision of adequate counsel in indigent criminal cases are critical for the sustainability of the rule of law, particularly in developing countries with histories of extrajudicial or other arbitrary criminal investigations. AOJ also is an effective tool in combating new forms of crime and corruption that are emerging in transitional states. Efficacy in the area of public defense is equally important.

44. The Center, with Department of Justice and non-governmental colleagues, works with missions to strengthen the administration of justice in developing countries. Taking advantage of structural reform, AOJ assistance seeks to ensure that judicial actors have the necessary skills and resources available to fulfill their mandate successfully in a reformed legal system.

Access to Justice

45. Developing societies often are characterized by economic, ethnic, gender, and religious divisions. Equal access for all to every aspect of the justice sector is critical. Legal recourse in criminal and civil matters is a right of each citizen. A citizen denied this right is not fully a citizen.

46. In conjunction with missions, the Center works with host country actors to develop

mechanisms to promote equal access to formal and informal systems of justice, as well as the development of legislation, regulations, and budgetary provisions for legal defense and dispute resolution. The process of ensuring access to justice involves working with local counterparts both within and outside the government.

Human Rights

47. Protection and exercise of human rights are an indispensable feature of a democratic state operating under the rule of law. Yet the struggle of many developing countries to undertake democratic reforms is hampered by legacies of human rights abuses. Legal reform, AOJ, and access to justice all are founded on the recognition of human rights. However, in order to build broad constituencies for reform in developing countries and ensure that the fruits of reform are shared with disadvantaged populations, special attention is paid to protecting the human rights of society's most vulnerable citizens.

48. The Center works with USAID missions and nongovernmental entities to strengthen the capacity of indigenous human rights organizations. With a focus on women's rights, women's political participation, and the rights of ethnic, cultural, and religious minorities, this priority area is closely related to efforts undertaken to improve "access to justice."

B. Elections and Political Process (SSO 2)

49. Free and fair elections are integral to a functioning democracy. Specific regional and country-specific situations sometimes require the staging of national elections within limited time-frames. Examples include countries emerging out of protracted civil war or countries whose governments have lost the confidence of their citizens. Such situations require focused efforts and rapid response logistical, administrative, and training capabilities. The Center works with missions and non-governmental partners to provide rapid response capabilities on the part of host governments and CSOs in the following areas: conducting pre-election assessments; training election commissions; training poll watchers and/or providing assistance to other polling officials; identifying, developing, and procuring election commodities; training indigenous and/or international election observers; developing civic and voter education techniques; training election officials, legislators, and government leaders; and developing programs to address gender, minority, and ethnic issues. The focus on this intervention is short-term, i.e., the successful conduct of a given election.

50. More generally, the problems that exist in newly emerging democracies include a weak institutional capacity to support, organize, and carry out elections; poorly organized political parties; and a lack of knowledge and understanding by citizens of the political process, electoral process, and the mechanics of voting. USAID programs to address these problems include election planning and implementation, political party development, voter education, and support for domestic and international monitoring groups. These efforts focus increasingly on the long-term institutionalization of appropriate political procedures through the strengthening of local capacity.

Opportunity and Participation

51. A democratically-elected government is not the sole indicator of democracy. The strength of a democratic state also depends on the inclusiveness of its electorate, the degree to which its citizens are aware of their rights and responsibilities, and the degree to which its citizens are able to participate politically.

52. Through civic education, the Center works with field missions and nongovernmental partners to increase: awareness and knowledge of registration and voting procedures; levels of voter participation; and indigenous capacity to develop and produce programs and material to augment awareness and participation. In the context of elections and political processes, civic education themes include: voters' rights and duties, procedures related to the conduct of an election, sample ballot review, transparency, accountability, and responsiveness of representation.

53. The Center promotes electoral and political participation of women and other groups disadvantaged because of their economic, ethnic, or religious status. It works alongside missions and nongovernmental partners to heighten awareness of the importance of broad participation in the political process; strengthen advocacy groups working on behalf of women and disadvantaged groups; expand access to political positions and processes; promote equitable laws, policies and practices; strengthen regional capacity to implement and effectively enforce laws, policies and decisions; and promote networking to facilitate the transfer of ideas, strategies, and resources, as well as build regional and international solidarity among women and other disadvantaged groups.

Institutional Development

54. Institutional development involves strengthening the institutions at the core of the electoral system. With a view towards long-term institutional development, the Center is focused on working towards the strengthening of electoral commissions and political parties.

55. While electoral law provides the legal basis for an election system, an electoral commission is the primary agency responsible for overseeing the law. Along with partners and host-governments, the Center provides technical assistance to election commissions in the following: interpreting the electoral law and adopting electoral regulations; developing procedures for registering voters, implementing a voter registration process, and publishing voter lists; regulating election campaigns; developing capacity to implement effective, non-partisan, civic education campaigns; and establishing mechanisms for reporting the results from polling sites to central headquarters, and for announcing official results.

56. The participation of independent and non-partisan indigenous NGOs in the electoral process often contributes in a major and constructive manner to a transparent and fair election. Supporting such NGOs is viewed as positive from several perspectives: it involves local personnel, builds local capacity, strengthens civic culture and non-partisan behavior, bolsters democratic institution-building, and is far more cost-effective than flying in external observers. The Center works to train and build capacity of these NGOs to effectively monitor elections, perform poll watching, conduct quick counts, and initiate other methods for monitoring the election process.

57. The Center's activities with political parties focus on developing structures that allow them to effectively field candidates who adequately represent various constituencies, sectors, issues, and ideologies in society. This support is also geared towards developing parties' institutional and administrative capacities, financial management systems, and ability to effectively and democratically manage internal hierarchies and decision-making mechanisms.

58. In an effort to bridge the gap between elections assistance and programs which foster good governance, the Center encourages continued USAID engagement through post-elections assistance. This support may include capacity/resource development; training sessions for newly elected leaders; NGO support; and post-election roundtables for all parties involved in the election to discuss the electoral process and plan for the immediate future. In addition, post-elections support may involve legislative strengthening/training and the creation of mechanisms for citizen participation in public policy, the development of legislation, and the encouragement of government accountability.

C. Civil Society (SSO 3)

59. The hallmark of a free society is the ability of individuals to associate with like-minded individuals, express their views publicly, openly debate public policy, and petition their government. "Civil society" is an increasingly accepted term which best describes the non-governmental, not-for-profit, independent nature of this segment of society. In countries with fragile democratic traditions, the freedoms so necessary to building and sustaining an active and independent civil society often are little understood, temporarily curtailed, or simply denied. USAID is working to strengthen commitment to an independent and politically active civil society in developing countries. The range of groups receiving USAID assistance includes coalitions of professional associations, civic education groups, women's rights organizations, business and labor federations, media groups, bar associations, environmental activist groups, and human rights monitoring organizations.

60. Also of great significance is the Agency's support for democratic and independent trade unions. In most countries, trade unions are the largest and most inclusive grassroots organizations. Consequently, they are instrumental in fostering development and consolidation of democracy. In many countries, free and independent trade unions have been vocal opponents of repression and—in many cases—at the forefront of the democracy movement.

Enabling Environment

61. Civil society organizations (CSOs) cannot survive, let alone flourish, if they are faced with a constraining legal environment or lack the constitutional and legal framework necessary to validate their existence and parameters of operation. A minimum level of public space and legal scope is a prerequisite for effective CSO operations. CSOs must have access to institutional mechanisms and arenas where they can engage the public and the state in dialogue and advocacy. Elections; the right to recall, petition, and ballot initiatives; and the use of referenda and public hearings are all mechanisms which potentially allow CSOs to engage both the public and the government on issues of concern. But such mechanisms are often severely constrained or even non-existent. Similarly, institutional arenas where public dialogue on fundamental reform issues

can be voiced—the media, universities, the judiciary, political parties, legislatures, local government, administrative boards that include CEO representation—may be ineffective or seriously compromised by government controls. Finally, many CSOs are dependent in great part, if not entirely, upon outside donor financing. There is thus a need for the development of a regulatory environment that allows for financial sustainability. An in-country enabling environment for individual and corporate contributions to public interest organizations is an essential ingredient contributing to CSO viability.

62. The Center is working, along with missions, partners and host governments, to assist legislatures and constitutional committees in the drafting of legislation to create space for CSO involvement in the public policy and political spheres. The design of legal frameworks to support the growth of civil society includes the strengthening of laws on freedom of association; the design of NGO registration procedures which are simple, low-cost, timely, and transparent; and the provision of tax laws which are favorable to the NGO sector, enabling NGOs to raise funds and engage in income-generating activities.

Organizational Strengthening

63. In order for CSOs to be viable, they need to develop the institutional resilience that allows them to survive over time and respond strategically to the challenges presented by their environment. Assistance with institutional capacity-building is thus critical to strengthening civil society. This assistance includes providing technical support in such areas as strategic planning and management, financial management and evaluation, and personnel/human resource management. These activities are intended to strengthen civil society organizations' internal practices of democratic governance such as accountability, diversity (particularly as it relates to gender), and transparency.

64. Adeptness in financial resource mobilization has been a major weakness of CSOs. In countries where donors are active, CSOs are seldom able to rely on income from fees or member dues. Accordingly, it is particularly important to develop organizational skills in raising funds from more diverse domestic sources. Often, this includes providing assistance in building accounting systems and methods of internal control which are essential to building donor confidence and trust.

65. The Center works with field missions and partners to provide technical assistance to CSOs in a number of areas. It helps CSOs to help draft by-laws and other charter documents, develop participatory approaches to organizational management, and develop client outreach capability. The Center also helps CSOs to conduct strategic planning and management, implement program monitoring and evaluation plans, and improve accounting, financial management, and personnel management practices. It helps them with the formulation of policies, analysis, and advocacy; the development of civic education strategies and curriculum materials; the building of coalitions and constituencies; and the practice of conflict resolution and mediation. The Center assists CSOs to develop media/communications strategies, fundraising campaigns, and awareness of sector-specific issues (e.g., elections, human rights, public health, environmental management, and sustainable agriculture).

66. The Center also works with American Center for International Labor Solidarity (ACILS), recently formed to consolidate the work of the four regional labor institutes affiliated with the AFL-CIO for work in Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean. With a USAID grant, ACILS provides technical assistance and collaborate with indigenous trade union organizations to: (1) enhance trade union democracy and the role of unions in the strengthening of civil society; (2) promote the establishment of democratic systems through advocacy for reform; (3) participate actively in the formulation of public policies that create the conditions for broad-based economic growth; (4) promote the acceptance of international labor standards and enforcement of national labor legislation; and (5) eliminate child labor and protect the rights of women workers.

67. In the next five years, ACILS will continue to seek new and innovative approaches to implementing global labor programs. In addition to promoting USAID civil society program objectives, the USAID grant will focus on the strategic role and participation of unions in promoting democratic governance, free and transparent elections, the rule of law, and broad-based economic growth strategies, which are intrinsically linked to the future of work in the global economy.

Advocacy

68. If civil society is to be strong, CSOs need to be skilled in policy analysis and advocacy. This includes the capacity to analyze thoroughly a given policy context, develop proposals that are technically well-grounded, and articulate a cogent and convincing reform agenda. Development of CSO capacities to inform and handle the media is also particularly important, as is the development of CSO abilities to monitor and enforce reforms adopted by government. Too frequently, a CSO reform agenda is rhetorically adopted but never fully realized, because the requisite regulatory practices and institutional procedures are neither enacted nor implemented.

69. The Center is working with field missions and partners to provide assistance and training in advocacy and the monitoring of government activity. Through partnerships and contracting mechanisms, the Center also provides technical assistance to CSOs to strengthen policy and governance reform expertise, particularly in the areas of elections and political processes, rule of law and judicial processes, local government, constitutional reform, and other non-DG USAID assistance sectors (e.g., environment, health, and broad-based economic growth).

D. Governance (SSO 4)

70. A key determinant for successful democratic consolidation is the ability of democratically-elected governments to provide "good governance."⁹ While many citizens of developing countries value characteristics associated with democracy (e.g., elections, human rights, and representation), they are often equally interested in qualities such as public accountability, responsiveness, transparency, and efficiency. "Good governance" assumes a government's ability to maintain social peace, guarantee law and order, promote or create conditions necessary for economic growth, and ensure a minimum level of social security. Yet many new governments fail to realize the long-term benefits of adopting effective governance policies. Even in cases where governments recognize the value of such policies, they often lack the capacity to implement them. For these reasons, newly democratic governments too often revert to more familiar patterns of authoritarianism and abuse.

71. Because the behavior of formal state actors can support or undermine developmental and democratic processes, USAID works to encourage and assist young democratic governments to reform their structures and processes to make them more transparent, accountable, and participatory. Within USAID, the Center works with its mission and non-governmental partners to reform governmental processes and structures in such a way that newly democratic governments see themselves as accountable to their citizens. It attempts to achieve this objective through its work in the following five governance-sector priority areas.

Governmental Integrity

72. To successfully build and sustain democracy, a government must respect ethical standards and act in a transparent manner. The lack of such standards and behavior, compounded by social inequalities, often results in corrupt practices. Without transparency or governmental integrity, democratic institutions are weakened and the allocation of scarce resources distorted. A selected few inevitably benefit at the expense of the majority of the population. Corrupt governments impede economic development and drive citizens away from the political process.

73. With its mission partners as well as non-governmental partners such as Transparency International, the Center works with host governments and non-state counterparts to combat corruption by encouraging government practices and procedures that oppose and combat corrupt behavior within the government. These practices and procedures include: drafting codes of ethics/honesty, performing investigative audits, conducting corruption awareness training, building transparency into transactions, and developing and applying incentives and sanctions to avoid corrupt behavior.

According to the World Bank, "good governance" is defined as "the management of public resources in ways that are effective, efficient and responsive to real societal needs, involving both accountability and transparency." [Source: Robert C. Charlick, *Improving Democratic Governance in Africa* (Washington D.C.: Associates in Rural Development, Inc., 1996): 2].

Democratic Decentralization

74. In many developing countries, local governments are not elected directly by the citizens they represent or govern. In many cases, local government officials are instead appointed by the executive branch and directly subordinate to a designated ministry. In cases where elected officials or local assemblies do exist, they are often associated with one-party regimes that effectively deny any independence from the central state.

75. Democratic decentralization and local government strengthening are means to promote good governance for citizens at the most direct and accessible level. The Agency works to encourage central governments to devolve genuine authority for decisionmaking to local governments and to equip local governments to use this authority effectively. Under the right conditions, donor interventions are instrumental in increasing public sector accountability and effectiveness. Moreover, increasing capacity for meaningful decisionmaking at the local government level can serve as an internal check on the power of the central state and thus complement civil society efforts.

76. In this priority area, the Center works through its technical leadership and field support efforts: (1) to increase participatory decisionmaking, transparency, accountability, and responsiveness at all levels of government by working with both formal state and non-state actors; and (2) to increase local participation in government and assist local government to serve as a balance/counterbalance to central state authorities. Toward these objectives, the Center and its mission partners work to: assist central governments with decentralization planning and implementation, strengthen the functioning of local governments, assist governments and NGOs to establish anti-corruption policies, and increase participation in the government sector.

Legislative Strengthening

77. Democratic governance is predicated on the capacity of representative institutions to deliberate on issues of public concern and to pass legislation that embodies the national (or local) interest. Deliberative bodies such as national assemblies and parliaments provide a forum in which elected representatives can debate the merits of specific laws. They also allow representatives to enhance this debate by calling on members of the executive branch to defend their policies, or on special constituencies (e.g., business associations, environmental groups) to comment on the impact that proposed legislation will have on their members. In addition to its lawmaking and representative functions, the legislative branch undertakes important oversight functions vis-a-vis the executive branch. Yet in many developing countries, the legislature is overshadowed by the executive branch, leaving it unable to provide adequate checks and balances or to adequately represent its constituents.

78. The Center seeks to improve the capacity, performance, oversight, and representative functions of lawmaking bodies. Ultimately, the Center's efforts aim to improve the capacity of deliberative bodies to better represent the public interest and monitor governmental performance. Through its leadership and the support of non-governmental partners such as the State University of New York (SUNY) Research Foundation, the Center increases the capacity of mission partners

to: (1) provide assistance to host country officials and NGOs toward the development and implementation of democratic procedures and practices; (2) provide training to host country officials and NGOs on "best practices" for public officials, policy formulation, public meetings/hearings, and public policy mediation/negotiation; and (3) provide commodities on a limited basis to increase the efficiency, knowledge, and physical infrastructure of deliberative bodies.

Civil-Military Relations

79. Establishing civilian authority over the military is a critical prerequisite to sustainable democratization. In countries under the direct or indirect influence of the military or in which elected governments have been overturned by military coups, the successful negotiation and consolidation of a democratic transition depends on the effective control of armed forces by civilian and elected governments. In many countries where elected governments have replaced military or one-party regimes, civilian control remains uncertain. Military institutions continue to retain a significant degree of power, not only over their own mission and administration, but in the political arena as well. Several factors contribute to effective civilian control over the military. These include: constitutions and legal structures that establish specific roles for armed forces; formal and informal rules and practices of government; competence of civilian authorities in military affairs; and mutual sense of confidence and trust between civilian authorities and armed forces.

80. Several U.S. government agencies are actively involved in improving civil-military relations. Through the U.S. Defense Department's International Military Education Training program, for example, foreign military officers are trained in subjects including human rights, military justice, and defense resources management. Several U.S.-based institutions also are active in highlighting issues related to civil-military relations. USAID has been involved in generating dialogue between military officers, civilian leaders, and academics in Latin America. Additionally, individual USAID missions have conducted activities specific to demobilization and the reintegration of demobilized soldiers into postwar society.

81. In the area of civil-military relations, the Center's priorities focus on capacity-building and information-sharing to benefit civilians in interacting and providing oversight over the military: (1) enabling legislative and executive branches of host governments to increase their competence in analyzing and formulating security/defense policy; (2) assisting civil society organizations to build competence in civil-military relations issues outside of government; (3) increasing opportunities for interaction among military officials, civilian government officials, and civil society representatives; (4) strengthening the capacity of non-military actors to analyze military operations; and (5) aggregating and disseminating experience and lessons learned in civil-military relations globally.

Conflict Mitigation and Prevention

82. Conflicting vested interests often emerge in times of change; resulting disputes must be managed to achieve the greater good. Disputes about public policy are common. Diverse opinions and the rise of antagonism must be expected with attempts to change policies, institutions and procedures; re-distribute land, property and other resources; relocate or resettle displaced populations; or increase citizen participation and access to government decision-making and services. Likewise, the chances for disagreement are great when political groups/parties attempt to share power or as central governments begin the process of decentralization. Resolving conflict is an integral part of development practice today, and new methods of dispute resolution are being employed. Among them are the use of formal and informal processes of mediation, arbitration, collaborative problem solving, confidence-building, strategic management, and facilitation to address conflict-rife situations. The Agency's Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI), Fostering Resolution of Water Resources Disputes (FORWARD) program, and the community-based dispute resolution programs in South Africa provide excellent examples of the use of these new tools.

83. The Center will work to broaden the understanding and use of conflict resolution processes in development sectors where the implementation of specific policies and initiatives are constrained or hampered by conflict. The Center will develop practical guidelines on the use of conflict resolution tools and promotion of a democratic culture. Special attention will be given to conflict in governance-related issues, particularly those brought about during or following political change, for example, in the movement from single- to multi-party systems. The Center will make specific recommendations on how to minimize and manage conflict in sustainable development countries as democracy matures and pluralism increases. Through this program, USAID operating units will have access to training, consultation, technical assistance, and applied research on conflict mitigation techniques and best practices.

III. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS

84. The operation of the Center and the implementation of this Strategic Plan depend on funding for program development/delivery expenses, operating expenses, and the allocation of skilled personnel.

85. The Center receives basic funding through an allocation of the Development Assistance Fund.¹⁰ This funding is used to support the primary program function of technical leadership, core funding of field support instruments, and management of fundamental global activities. Basic operating expense funding provides the means for Center personnel travel for field support purposes and Center sponsorship of training for direct-hire and OE-funded contract personnel. Core staffing of the Center is funded by the Agency; these costs are not reflected in the Center-controlled budget.

¹⁰ The Development Assistance Fund and Economic Support Funds are the primary means of support for the overall USAID program. Annual appropriations for foreign assistance are deliberated by the U.S. Congress for enactment by the President. Basic authorizing legislation is found in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as revised.

86. Core program funding is supplemented, on a "demand" basis, through allocations of Economic Support Funds (ESF) and fund transfers from other USAID operating units. The Center receives these funds for the management of DG activities on behalf of other USAID operating units.

A. Program Funding

87. An annual allocation to the Center of \$20 million in Development Assistance Funds is planned through 2002, for a total planned allocation of \$100 million over the five-year planning period of FYs 1998 through 2002. The Center's FY 1997 program budget includes \$21 million in Development Assistance Funds. Of this amount, \$9 million is directed to labor development. This strategy assumes continuation of the Administrative Directive on labor, and funding at a level proportional to that now in effect, i.e., about 43 percent of the \$21 million DG program. Planned allocations to the other areas of program focus are identified in Table 1.

88. In FY 97, the Center is managing \$4.6 million in ESF, the bulk of which is used for elections/political processes-related development activities. Over time, as program assistance instruments are further developed in the areas of rule of law, civil society, and governance, the allocation of ESF is expected to rise. A total program level of \$50 million in ESF is planned for the five-year period of FYs 1998 through 2002.

89. Funds transfers to the Center from field missions and geographic bureaus are planned at a level of approximately \$2.5 million in FY 97. LAC and ENI are expected to account for most of the current-year transfer. This figure is expected to rise substantially as the Center's portfolio matures, DG strategies in AFR countries are further elaborated, joint planning relationships are established, and USAID's field presence is reduced. Mission-managed add-ons to Center-managed IQCs, cooperative agreements, and grant programs currently amount to \$20 - \$30 million annually, and are expected to hold within this range through the planning period.

[Insert Table 1 here]

B. Operations

90. An adequate level of human resources is absolutely critical to the Center's achievement of its strategy. With more FTEs, the Center can achieve more in technical leadership, field support, and global programs. Utilizing re-engineering approaches has made the overall work of the Center more effective, but it is extremely labor-intensive. The Center's optimal staffing level (and as suggested by the original design team) is 35 FTEs. A minimum number of 27 FTEs is required for successful accomplishment of the Center's work.

91. Of the 24 USDH (FTE) positions currently approved for the DG Center, 17 are assigned to technical teams. The Center is organized around five teams, one for each of the four substantive areas of the program, and a fifth for strategies development, cross-cutting functions and geographic coordination. The work of the fifth team (strategies and field support) is not captured by a separate strategic objective, but it is critical to the achievement of Center objectives, tying together and supporting the attainment of the more specific strategic support objectives. The Center Director, Deputy Director, Administrative Assistant, and a Program Unit staff of four account for the remaining USDH positions.

92. The Center draws on non-USDH personnel secured through existing RSSA arrangements and fellowship programs. The employment of part-time USDH personnel through the WAE provision serves to assist in the handling of work surges and unanticipated rapid-response needs. This will likely become less necessary as all USDH positions are finally allocated and filled.

93. The full complement of 43 G/DG staff members is identified by function in Table 2.¹¹ Listed are 27 USDHs, four RSSAs, eight fellows (three from AAAS and five from a program-funded contract with World Learning), and four WAEs. All personnel are funded directly by USAID through non-Center managed operating expense accounts, except for the four RSSAs and eight fellows. All costs associated with these positions are funded from the Development Assistance Fund allocation to the Center. In addition, a program-funded contract with the Academy for Educational Development provides four specialists for research and reference services.

94. Operating expense funding to pay for travel and training requirements of the direct-hire staff is required in the amount of approximately \$110,000 annually. Additional resources for training DG officers around the world will be required. Training workshops are estimated at \$50,000 each, and a self-study module will be developed.

¹¹ This number does not represent the existing G/DG staff pattern, but rather the number of staff needed to implement the proposed program.

[Insert Table 2 here]

Annex 1: G/DG Strategic Framework

Center For Democracy and Governance - Strategic Framework

Agency Goal 2 - SUSTAINABLE DEMOCRACIES BUILT			
Agency Objective 2.1 Strengthened rule of law and respect for human rights	Agency Objective 2.2 More genuine & competitive political processes	Agency Objective 2.3 Increased development of a politically active civil society	Agency Objective 2.4 More transparent & accountable government institutions
<p style="text-align: center;">SSO 1 Rule of Law</p> <p>Legal systems operate more effectively to embody democratic principles and protect human rights</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Indicators</p> <p>1.1 Countries effecting legal systems reform programs. <i>(Legal Reform)</i></p> <p>1.2 Countries effecting improved court administration programs. <i>(Administration of Justice)</i></p> <p>1.3 Countries introducing mechanisms to expand access of poor and/or marginalized populations to legal systems. <i>(Access to Justice)</i></p> <p>1.4 Countries improving civil and political rights. <i>(Human Rights)</i></p>	<p style="text-align: center;">SSO 2 Elections and Political Processes</p> <p>Political processes, including elections, are competitive and reflect the will of an informed citizenry</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Indicators</p> <p>2.1 Countries with independent electoral commissions operating effectively. <i>(Electoral Administration)</i></p> <p>2.2 Countries meeting targeted increases in the number of competitive women candidates. <i>(Opportunity and Participation)</i></p> <p>2.3 Countries with political parties organized to represent a broad constituency through internal democratic processes. <i>(Political Party Development)</i></p> <p>2.4 Countries reporting open and contested elections which reflect citizen satisfaction. <i>(Electoral Event)</i></p>	<p style="text-align: center;">SSO 3 Civil Society</p> <p>Informed citizens' groups effectively contribute to more responsive government</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Indicators</p> <p>3.1 Countries adopting policies to encourage proactive citizen groups. <i>(Enabling Environment)</i></p> <p>3.2 Countries with citizen groups advocating policy reforms. <i>(Advocacy)</i></p> <p>3.3 Countries with citizen groups demonstrating greater influence on government decisions. <i>(Impact)</i></p>	<p style="text-align: center;">SSO 4 Governance</p> <p>National and local government institutions more openly and effectively perform their public responsibilities</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Indicators</p> <p>4.1. Governments articulate and sponsor anti-corruption measures. <i>(Governmental Integrity)</i></p> <p>4.2. Local-level governments improve democratic processes. <i>(Democratic Decentralization)</i></p> <p>4.3. Legislative bodies improve their effectiveness and accountability. <i>(Legislative Strengthening)</i></p> <p>4.4. Countries progress toward effective civilian control over the national military. <i>(Civil-Military)</i></p> <p>4.5. Countries effectively manage conflict and policy implementation. <i>(Conflict Mitigation)</i></p>

<p>Rule of Law</p> <p>Intermediate Results</p> <p>1.1 Legal systems assessment methodologies developed and applied.</p> <p>1.2 Development of improved administration of justice models.</p> <p>1.3 Development of models for increased access to legal systems.</p> <p>1.4 Development of programs to reduce human rights/due process violations.</p> <p>Indicators</p> <p>1.1 Missions using legal systems assessment methodologies.</p> <p>1.2.1 Missions using court case management methodologies.</p> <p>1.2.2 Legal system professionals with improved professional standards.</p> <p>1.3.1 Missions utilizing alternative dispute resolution models.</p> <p>1.3.2 Missions adopting public defender programs.</p> <p>1.3.3 Missions adopting strategies for increasing legal systems access for women.</p> <p>1.4.1 Missions adopting pretrial detention reduction models.</p> <p>1.4.2 Issuance of a white paper on resolving due process/public security conflicts.</p>	<p>Elections and Political Processes</p> <p>Intermediate Results</p> <p>2.1 USAID methodology for providing assistance in elections administration, local elections and post-election training developed and applied.</p> <p>2.2 Manual on assistance to strengthen political parties developed and utilized.</p> <p>2.3 Center assistance mechanism for training women's political office candidates is utilized.</p> <p>2.4 Center assistance mechanism for elections/political processes strengthening is utilized.</p> <p>Indicators</p> <p>2.1. Missions using USAID methodology for providing assistance in elections administration, local elections or post elections training.</p> <p>2.2 Missions using guidance on assistance to strengthen political parties.</p> <p>2.3 Missions/Embassies using the Center's mechanism to train women political office candidates.</p> <p>2.4 Missions/Embassies using the Center's mechanism to strengthen elections/political processes.</p>	<p>Civil Society</p> <p>Intermediate Results</p> <p>3.1 Civil Society program guidelines developed and applied.</p> <p>3.2. Selected unions strengthened</p> <p>3.3. Select civic-oriented NGOs strengthened;</p> <p>Indicators</p> <p>3.1 Missions using civil society program guidelines.</p> <p>3.2 Countries with unions better organized.</p> <p>3.3 Countries with civic-oriented NGOs better organized and/or financially viable.</p>	<p>Governance</p> <p>Intermediate Results</p> <p>4.1. Anti-corruption models developed and applied.</p> <p>4.2. Prototype strategies for effecting democratic decentralization developed and applied.</p> <p>4.3. Legislative Strengthening models and guidelines developed and applied.</p> <p>4.4 Model methodologies for anticipating and managing change and potential conflicts affecting governance developed and applied.</p> <p>4.5 Model methodologies for promoting civil-military relations at different stages of political transition developed and applied.</p> <p>Indicators</p> <p>4.1 Missions using methodologies for anti-corruption objective.</p> <p>4.2 Missions using prototype on democratic decentralization.</p> <p>4.3 Missions using legislative strengthening models and guidelines.</p> <p>4.4 Missions using policy change and conflict mitigation models.</p> <p>4.5 Countries using model methodologies for promoting civil-military relations.</p>
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Annex 2: Performance Data Sheets

- ! Rule of Law**
- ! Elections and Political Processes**
- ! Civil Society**
- ! Governance**

Performance Data Sheets: Rule of Law



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Performance Data Sheets: Rule of Law SSOs and Indicators

AGENCY OBJECTIVE 2.1:

Strengthened rule of law and respect for human rights.



SSO 1 RULE OF LAW:

Legal systems operate more effectively to embody democratic principles and protect human rights.

Approved: June 1997 **Organization:** G/DG

INDICATOR 1.1: Countries effecting legal systems reform programs.
(*Legal Reform*)

UNIT OF MEASURE: Percentage of countries with USAID presence effecting law reform programs.

SOURCE: R4s.

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: A law reform program is any ROL component in which the improvement of justice sector performance (i.e., greater efficacy, efficiency, more respect for civil and political rights) is sought through the writing of basic legislation. These include criminal, civil, and organizational components. Organizational refers to reforms that restructure or reorganize institutions or change basic organizational procedures (e.g. appointment systems, tenure, governance, budgets). "Reform programs" include constitutions, statutes, and regulations.

COMMENTS: Scores are cumulative, although countries will "drop out" if they abandon or successfully complete a program. Given the time required from initial adoption through implementation, there is little expectation of "drop outs" due to successful termination during the five-year period. Over a longer time frame, however, the "drop out" phenomenon may lead to an illusion of performance "backsliding."

YEAR	PLANNED (%)	ACTUAL
97	35	
98	45	
99	55	
00	65	
01	75	
02	80	

AGENCY OBJECTIVE 2.1:

Strengthened rule of law and respect for human rights.

**SSO 1 RULE OF LAW:**

Legal systems operate more effectively to embody democratic principles and protect human rights.

Approved: June 1997 **Organization:** G/DG

INDICATOR 1.2: Countries effecting improved court administration programs.

(Administration of Justice)

UNIT OF MEASURE: Percentage of countries with USAID presence effecting improved court administration.

SOURCE: Field mission reports.

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Improved court administration programs include any activities aimed at rationalizing administrative procedures within courts. Examples include new filing systems, adoption of court administrator positions, manual or computerized systems for tracking cases and caseloads, and training of judges and other court personnel in administrative skills.

COMMENTS: Scoring is cumulative; for the time being, the emphasis is on the adoption of programs. Impact is too difficult to measure over the short-run and may be difficult to compare across systems with very different problems. In most countries, merely getting judiciaries to focus on improvements derived from creating administrative practices is an enormous advance.

YEAR	PLANNED (%)	ACTUAL
97	20	
98	35	
99	45	
00	50	
01	55	
02	55	

AGENCY OBJECTIVE 2.1:

Strengthened rule of law and respect for human rights.

**SSO 1 RULE OF LAW:**

Legal systems operate more effectively to embody democratic principles and protect human rights.

Approved: June 1997 **Organization:** G/DG

INDICATOR 1.3: Countries introducing mechanisms to expand access of women and poor and other marginalized populations to legal systems.
(*Access to Justice*)

UNIT OF MEASURE: Percentage of countries with USAID presence introducing mechanisms to expand access to legal systems.

SOURCE: R4s, field mission reports, DOS human rights reports.

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Mechanisms to expand access include free legal clinics (NGO or government-sponsored), public defenders' offices, ADR mechanisms, recognition of traditional dispute resolution systems and means to incorporate them into the formal justice system, addition of local judges, special courts, translators, and access for the physically challenged.

Marginalized populations include women, children, the physically challenged, and national, religious, racial, and ethnic minorities or majorities not included in the dominant culture.

Indicator includes programs in both criminal and civil justice.

COMMENTS: This category includes the most varied types of programs; what is relevant depends on accessibility to formal institutions and major barriers to access. Over the longer run the indicator might shift to measure increased access, but over the short run, the most important indicator is an effort to resolve the problem of little or no access. The Human Rights Access RFA is premised on substantial programmatic focus on increasing access to the justice system for women.

YEAR	PLANNED (%)	ACTUAL
97	30	
98	35	
99	45	
00	55	
01	60	
02	65	

AGENCY OBJECTIVE 2.1:

Strengthened rule of law and respect for human rights.

**SSO 1 RULE OF LAW:**

Legal systems operate more effectively to embody democratic principles and protect human rights.

Approved: June 1997 **Organization:** G/DG

INDICATOR 1.4: Countries improving civil and political rights.
(*Human Rights*)

UNIT OF MEASURE: Percentage of countries with USAID presence improving civil and political rights.

SOURCE: DOS Human Rights Reports.

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Improvement will be defined by DOS Human Rights Report, but should be based on a reduction in the most egregious human rights violations, especially those involving threats to life, liberty, physical integrity, and due process.

COMMENTS: Since the variety of countries covered are at all levels in terms of existing violations, the goal is improvement. For some countries, this will mean a reduction in extrajudicial killings, illegal detentions, torture, and disappearances. For those higher on the scale it might mean reduction in unsentenced prisoners, improvement of prison conditions, or provision of free defense to poor suspects. It is assumed that in some countries, a reduction in abuses is not a goal (because abuses are not a problem). As long as these countries constitute a minority, this factor should not skew the overall results.

YEAR	PLANNED (%)	ACTUAL
97	N.A.	
98	N.A.	
99	35	
00	40	
01	45	
02	50	

Performance Data Sheets: Rule of Law

Intermediate Results and Indicators

SSO 1 RULE OF LAW:

Legal systems operate more effectively to embody democratic principles and protect human rights.



Approved: June 1997 **Organization:** G/DG

INTERMEDIATE RESULT 1.1: Legal systems assessment methodologies developed and applied.

INDICATOR 1.1: Missions using legal systems assessment methodologies.

UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of missions.

SOURCE: Reports from field missions.

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: The legal assessment methodology is a tool being developed by the Center for use in the field; it will provide a standard means for evaluating ROL needs in preparation for a program, or for checking progress as a program develops.

COMMENTS: Since the tool is being developed in FY 97, the only countries included in that year are those chosen for field testing. Thereafter, success will be measured in terms of missions which use the methodology as a means to develop a program or to check progress as the program continues. It also may be used as an evaluation tool for activities nearing completion. Chemonics is developing and field testing the tool under IQC# AEP-5468-I-00-6030-00. The methodology will be developed by reviewing past assessments of USAID and other donors, and lessons learned from those efforts. The new and improved methodology will be disseminated by G/DG within USAID, and Chemonics will hold a one-day workshop on the methodology in AID/W to present it.

YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
97	2	
98	7	
99	10	
00	20	
01	20	
02	20	

SSO 1 RULE OF LAW:

Legal systems operate more effectively to embody democratic principles and protect human rights.



Approved: June 1997 **Organization:** G/DG

INTERMEDIATE RESULT 1.2: Development of improved AOJ models.

INDICATOR 1.2.1: Missions using court case management methodologies.

UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of missions.

SOURCE: Field mission documents (R4, cables, E-mail communications, etc); IQC quarterly reports.

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: The case management methodologies are pilot manual and computerized systems the Center will consolidate from the most successful field experience. It is anticipated that they will have to be adapted to the local circumstances of each country, but that they will provide general models and so facilitate development of such systems in conjunction with any program.

COMMENTS: The models will be developed in 1997 through a study conducted by the National Center for State Courts (NMS no. 122). The five countries expected to participate in the study are Bolivia, Columbia, Panama, Peru and Egypt. The first three follow-on countries will be determined after the study is completed (expected by 10/97); assuming successful development of the models, there should be a gradual increase of countries drawing on the studies (as opposed to simply developing their own from scratch).

YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
97	N.A.	
98	3	
99	6	
00	9	
01	12	
02	14	

SSO 1 RULE OF LAW:

Legal systems operate more effectively to embody democratic principles and protect human rights.



Approved: June 1997 **Organization:** G/DG

INTERMEDIATE RESULT 1.2: Development of improved AOJ models.

INDICATOR 1.2.2: Legal system professionals with improved professional standards.

UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of professionals participating in G/DG-sponsored training programs.

SOURCE: Field mission reports and contractor reports.

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: This indicator will track the number of legal system professionals (lawyers, judges, court personnel, etc.) who have benefitted from Center-managed programs, including specifically: International Development Law Institute (IDLI), DOJ/OPDAT (through DOJ PASA), and Federal Judiciary (through IAA).

COMMENTS: We accept the assumption that training provided through Center-managed programs improves the professional standards and performance of trainees upon return to their home country assignments, whether those be within the judiciary, the bar, or other private or state practice. Center-managed activities feature either unique or novel training resources or programs developed by partner organizations emerging as "centers of excellence." Planning future results for this indicator must follow the establishment of baseline data for FY 97.

YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
97	50	
98	70	
99	80	
00	80	
01	90	
02	90	

SSO 1 RULE OF LAW:

Legal systems operate more effectively to embody democratic principles and protect human rights.



Approved: June 1997 **Organization:** G/DG

INTERMEDIATE RESULT 1.3: Development of models for increased access to legal systems.

INDICATOR 1.3.1: Missions utilizing alternative dispute resolution models.

UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of missions.

SOURCE: Field mission reports.

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: The Center will develop models based on successful experiments in field missions and disseminate them to all ROL programs.

COMMENTS: As with the other models, the expectation is that the information dissemination of "best practices" will facilitate replication (with appropriate adaptations) to a wide variety of field missions.

This draws on the IQC with the Conflict Management Institute.
The contract has been signed and work has begun.

YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
97	N.A.	
98	2	
99	6	
00	10	
01	13	
02	15	

SSO 1 RULE OF LAW:

Legal systems operate more effectively to embody democratic principles and protect human rights.



Approved: June 1997 **Organization:** G/DG

INTERMEDIATE RESULT 1.3: Development of models for increased access to legal systems.

INDICATOR 1.3.2: Missions adopting public defender programs.

UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of missions.

SOURCE: Reports from field missions.

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: One of the Center's Democracy Fellows is producing a manual on institutional strengthening which includes a model for public defender programs. Use of the manual's recommendations and/or model in developing a country program will count as adoption. The model emphasizes a supervised program run by public or private sector entities.

COMMENTS: There are currently six ROL programs (five in Latin America and one in Asia) using a similar approach, which is the basis for the development of the model. The targets are cumulative.

YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
97	7	
98	10	
99	13	
00	16	
01	20	
02	22	

SSO 1 RULE OF LAW:

Legal systems operate more effectively to embody democratic principles and protect human rights.



Approved: June 1997 **Organization:** G/DG

INTERMEDIATE RESULT 1.3: Development of models for increased access to legal systems.

INDICATOR 1.3.3: Missions adopting strategies for increasing legal system access for women.

UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of missions.

SOURCE: Field mission reports.

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: The strategies are part of a proposed program which will begin in FY 98 or 99 and include review of the gender impacts (intended and unintended) of existing ROL programs, legal assessment findings as to obstacles to women, and selected mission activities to prepare a series of recommended strategies for enhancing access for women in specific cultural and legal contexts.

COMMENTS: Although most programs have focused on opening access to the poor and marginalized, more specific attention to women may be needed in ROL activities. The study outlined here and the resulting strategies will begin in FY 98 to allow them to benefit from knowledge accumulated in the sector assessment methodology and ongoing programs.

YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
97	N.A.	
98	N.A.	
99	4	
00	10	
01	15	
02	18	

SSO 1 RULE OF LAW:

Legal systems operate more effectively to embody democratic principles and protect human rights.



Approved: June 1997 **Organization:** G/DG

INTERMEDIATE RESULT 1.4: Development of programs to reduce human rights/due process violations.

INDICATOR 1.4.1: Missions adopting pretrial detention reduction models.

UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of missions.

SOURCE: Field mission reports.

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: The Center is developing, testing and disseminating pilot programs to reduce the time criminal defendants spend in pretrial detention in countries where this is a problem. The indicator refers to the adoption of these models or pilots in ROL programs.

COMMENTS: The pilots will be developed and tested in FY 97. The first countries will be those included in the experimental stage. Assuming successful development of a pilot, the scores for subsequent years are cumulative and reflect the gradual introduction of practices based on the pilots.

YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
97	N.A.	
98	1	
99	3	
00	6	
01	10	
02	12	

SSO 1 RULE OF LAW:

Legal systems operate more effectively to embody democratic principles and protect human rights.



Approved: June 1997 **Organization:** G/DG

INTERMEDIATE RESULT 1.4: Development of programs to reduce human rights/due process violations.

INDICATOR 1.4.2: Issuance of a white paper on resolving due process/public security conflicts.

UNIT OF MEASURE: Completed white paper and conference.

SOURCE: Center reports.

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: This is a study to be contracted by the Center to provide guidance to missions on dealing with this conflict of program values, i.e., civil liberties vs. public security.

COMMENTS: The finished paper may produce model programs leading to a second tier of indicators. For the foreseeable future, however, the result is the white paper itself.

YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
97	Draft paper completed.	
98	Paper disseminated; round-table held.	
99	N.A.	
00	N.A.	
01	N.A.	
02	N.A.	

Performance Data Sheets: Elections and Political Processes



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Performance Data Sheets: Elections and Political Processes SSOs and Indicators

AGENCY OBJECTIVE 2.2:

More genuine & competitive political processes.



SSO 2 ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL PROCESSES:

Political processes, including elections, are competitive and more effectively reflect the will of an informed citizenry.

Approved: June 1997 **Organization:** G/DG

INDICATOR 2.1:

Countries with independent electoral commissions operating effectively.

(Electoral Administration)

UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of countries.

SOURCE: Field missions/embassies, partners from the elections cooperative agreement, the Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS), and the IQC.

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Number of countries which have electoral commissions which function independently from the government.

COMMENTS: Countries will be selected on the basis of one or more of the following criteria:

- their strategic importance to US foreign policy;
- their stage of democratic development (post-conflict, new opportunities, transition, consolidation);
- history of poorly administered elections or partisan electoral commissions; or
- the opportunity to plan for election administration assistance jointly with the mission/embassy.

An independent electoral commission has adequate professional/knowledgeable members/staff and resources, and the willingness and ability to make decisions autonomously. An independent electoral commission operates effectively when it prepares for and carries out administrative and logistical aspects of the election, such as registration, designation of adequate polling sites, accurate voters' lists, vote tabulation, provision of security if needed, voter education, means for adjudication of complaints, etc.

Work on election administration is typically done episodically and only in advance of an important national election. The Center will endeavor to engage four missions in continuing to program in this area over a period of years (using Center models) to advance the competence, professionalism and independence of their respective commissions. Possible target countries include: the Philippines, Mali, Bosnia, and El Salvador.

YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
97	N.A.	
98	N.A.	
99	2	
00	3	
01	4	
02	4	

AGENCY OBJECTIVE 2.2:

More genuine & competitive political processes.

**SSO 2 ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL PROCESSES:**

Political processes, including elections, are competitive and more effectively reflect the will of an informed citizenry.

Approved: June 1997 **Organization:** G/DG

INDICATOR 2.2:

Countries meeting targeted increases in the number of competitive women candidates.
(*Opportunity and Participation*)

UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of countries.

SOURCE: Field missions/embassies, partners from the elections cooperative agreement, CEPPS, the IQC, or the Global Women in Politics cooperative agreement.

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Number of countries which have met identified incremental targets for women candidates trained and able to run competitively for political office.

COMMENTS: Countries will be selected on the basis of one or more of the following criteria:
 - missions/embassies which are participating in programs to train women candidates and which have set incremental targets for the number of women candidates;
 - traditionally poor participation of women in the political process;
 or
 - the opportunity to plan jointly with the mission/embassy.

The number of women candidates includes women who run for office at the local, municipal, regional or national levels, independently or with their party. Competitive means that the candidate has training and resources adequate to run effectively for office. Women candidates do not have to be elected to be included in this category.

YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
97	1	
98	3	
99	5	
00	7	
01	9	
02	11	

AGENCY OBJECTIVE 2.2:

More genuine & competitive political processes.

**SSO 2 ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL PROCESSES:**

Political processes, including elections, are competitive and more effectively reflect the will of an informed citizenry.

Approved: June 1997 **Organization:** G/DG

INDICATOR 2.3:

Countries with political parties organized to represent a broad constituency through internal democratic processes.

(Political Party Development)

UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of countries.

SOURCE: Field missions/embassies, partners from the elections cooperative agreement, CEPPS, and the IQC.

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Number of countries which have at least one political party which operates in a democratic manner internally and which represents a significant part of the electorate.

COMMENTS: Countries will be selected on the basis of one or more of the following criteria:

- their strategic importance to US foreign policy;
- their stage of democratic development (post-conflict, new opportunities, transition, consolidation);
- history of poorly organized, small fragmented parties, and/or parties which do not have internal democratic procedures; or
- the opportunity to plan political party development assistance jointly with the mission/embassy.

A political party operates in a democratic manner internally when it, inter alia, holds periodic, democratic elections for party offices, nominating candidates who reflect party membership; establishes by-laws agreed upon by the membership; holds/reports on open, scheduled meetings; ensures that the membership debates and approves the party platform; and has effective, enforced internal financial controls.

A political party represents a significant part of the electorate when it, inter alia, excludes no member based on ethnicity, religious beliefs or gender; establishes a mechanism to identify and expand a defined constituency; is organized geographically at several levels; maintains accurate membership lists.

Countries targeted for FY 1998 include Kenya and Paraguay.

The planned figure should increase as work in the field of elections and political processes begins to emphasize the role of parties in aggregating and representing citizens' interests, per the Center's model to be ready by the end of 1997.

YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
97	N.A.	
98	2	
99	3	
00	4	
01	5	
02	6	

AGENCY OBJECTIVE 2.2:

More genuine & competitive political processes.

**SSO 2 ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL PROCESSES:**

Political processes, including elections, are competitive and more effectively reflect the will of an informed citizenry.

Approved: June 1997 **Organization:** G/DG

INDICATOR 2.4:

Countries reporting open and contested elections which reflect citizen satisfaction.

(Electoral Event)

UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of countries.

SOURCE: Field missions/embassies, partners from the elections cooperative agreement, CEPPS, the IQC, or credible international press reports

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Number of assisted countries which have held parliamentary and/or presidential elections which have been judged open and fair by a preponderance of local and/or international observers or credible international media.

COMMENTS: Countries will be selected for assistance on the basis of one or more of the following criteria:

- strategic importance to the US;
- stage of democratic development (post-conflict, new opportunities, transition, consolidation);
- history of fraudulent or no elections or elections in which at least two parties did not compete on a fairly level playing field; or
- the opportunity to plan jointly with the mission/embassy.

Countries will be included if the Center, through any of its mechanisms, assisted the electoral process in any of the following ways (illustrative list):

- provided international observers;
- trained/networked with local observers;
- provided technical assistance/training to election administrators;
- provided/assisted voted education;
- provided commodities, identified, developed, trained in use of same;
- strengthened political parties; or
- conducted pre-election assessments or periodic evaluation missions.

Countries reporting in FY 1997 may include: Pakistan, Yemen, Croatia, Mali, Burkina Faso, Lesotho, Congo, Bosnia, Haiti (local), Madagascar, and El Salvador. Neither Pakistan nor Haiti were in original plans.

NB: Actual figures for 1997 (to date) do not reflect a number of elections set for later in the year.

Countries in FY 1998 may include: Paraguay, Cambodia, Zimbabwe, Liberia, Mozambique, Kenya, and Albania.

Planned figures show a decline as more countries hold successful elections without need of USAID assistance.

YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
97	8	
98	3	
99	5	
00	6	
01	5	
02	4	

Performance Data Sheets: Elections and Political Processes
IRs and Indicators

SSO 2 ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL PROCESSES:

Political processes, including elections, are competitive and more effectively reflect the will of an informed citizenry.



Approved: June 1997 **Organization:** G/DG

INTERMEDIATE RESULT 2.1:

USAID methodology for providing assistance in election administration, local elections and post-election training developed and applied.

INDICATOR 2.1:

Missions using USAID methodology for providing assistance in election administration, local elections or post-election training.

UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of missions.

SOURCE: Field missions/embassies and partners from the elections cooperative agreement, CEPPS, and the IQC.

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Number of missions which have used the Center's models/reports/lessons learned/findings/guidance before providing assistance in election administration, local elections, or post-election training.

COMMENTS: Missions will be selected on the basis of one or more of the following criteria applied to the country in which the mission resides:

- their strategic importance to US foreign policy;
- their stage of democratic development (post-conflict, new opportunities, transition, consolidation); or
- the opportunity to plan jointly with the mission/embassy assistance in election administration, local elections or post-election training

The Elections Team plans to issue a delivery order against an existing IQC to conduct research in these three areas of Agency programming (election administration, local elections and post elections training) to determine lessons learned and best practices and to establish models of efficient, effective, timely, politically-sensitive assistance.

Missions targeted for each of the three areas will be determined after field studies are completed and preliminary models have been developed.

YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
97	N.A.	
98	2	
99	4	
00	5	
01	6	
02	7	

SSO 2 ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL PROCESSES:

Political processes, including elections, are competitive and more effectively reflect the will of an informed citizenry.



Approved: June 1997 **Organization:** G/DG

INTERMEDIATE RESULT 2.2:

Manual on assistance to strengthen political parties developed and utilized.

INDICATOR 2.2:

Missions using guidance on assistance to strengthen political parties.

UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of missions.

SOURCE: Field missions/embassies and partners from the elections cooperative agreement, CEPPS, and the IQC.

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Number of missions which have used the Center's models/reports/lessons learned/findings/guidance before providing assistance to strengthen political parties.

COMMENTS: Missions will be selected on the basis of one or more of the following criteria as applied to the country in which the mission resides:

- their strategic importance to US foreign policy;
- their stage of democratic development (post-conflict, new opportunities, transition, consolidation); or
- the opportunity to plan assistance to strengthen political parties jointly with the mission/embassy.

The Elections Team currently has underway a study of Agency projects in this area. The study's purpose is to determine appropriate results for these activities which will conform to legislative restrictions and overall Agency policies and objectives; to analyze projects to distill best practices and lessons learned; and to recommend policy guidelines for this politically sensitive area and program ideas. The team is issuing a delivery order against an existing IQC to conduct research and to prepare a manual at the conclusion of the study. The manual will set forth policy and program guidelines for the missions.

YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
97	N.A.	
98	2	
99	3	
00	4	
01	5	
02	6	

SSO 2 ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL PROCESSES:

Political processes, including elections, are competitive and more effectively reflect the will of an informed citizenry.



Approved: June 1997 **Organization:** G/DG

INTERMEDIATE RESULT 2.3:

Center assistance mechanism for training women political office candidates is utilized.

INDICATOR 2.3:

Missions/embassies using the Center's mechanism to train women political office candidates.

UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of missions/embassies. SOURCE: Field missions/embassies, partners from the elections cooperative agreement, CEPPS, and the IQC. INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Number of missions/embassies transferring funds to the Center to add-on to the GWIP CA. COMMENTS: Missions/embassies will be selected on the basis of one or more of the following criteria as applied to the country in which the mission/embassy resides: - their strategic importance to US foreign policy; - their stage of democratic development (post-conflict, new opportunities, transition, consolidation); or - the opportunity to plan jointly with the mission/embassy assistance in training women as candidates for political office.	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
	97	4	
	98	5	
	99	7	
	00	9	
	01	11	
	02	13	

SSO 2 ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL PROCESSES:

Political processes, including elections, are competitive and more effectively reflect the will of an informed citizenry.



Approved: June 1997 **Organization:** G/DG

INTERMEDIATE RESULT 2.4:

Selected elections and political processes within countries strengthened.

INDICATOR 2.4:

Countries reporting successful employment of DG Center assistance mechanisms for strengthening of elections and political processes.

UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of countries.

SOURCE: Field missions/embassies and partners from the elections cooperative agreement, CEPPS.

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Number of countries in which USAID resources were employed and receiving organizations report that assistance was beneficial.

COMMENTS: Countries will be selected on the basis of one or more of the following criteria:

- their strategic importance to US foreign policy;
- their stage of democratic development (post-conflict, new opportunities, transition, consolidation); or
- the opportunity to plan jointly with the mission/embassy assistance to strengthen elections/political processes.

On an annual basis, planned/actual numbers may decrease/fluctuate for the following reasons:

- 1) work continues under CEPPS in the same country for a number of years;
- 2) mission close-outs;
- 3) improvement in indigenous capacity to hold fair elections;
- or 4) variance in number of elections held in any one year.

NB: CEPPS is scheduled for close-out in 1998; this table assumes that CEPPS, or a similar agreement, will be in place.

YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
97	14	
98	8	
99	10	
00	7	
01	6	
02	4	

Performance Data Sheets: Civil Society



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Performance Data Sheets: Civil Society SSOs and Indicators

AGENCY OBJECTIVE 2.3:

Increased development of a politically active civil society.



SSO 3 CIVIL SOCIETY

Informed citizens' groups effectively contribute to more responsive government.

Approved: June 1997 **Organization:** G/DG

INDICATOR 3.1:

Countries adopting policies to encourage proactive citizens' groups.
(*Enabling Environment*)

UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of countries adopting policies which encourage growth of the NGO sector. Targets identified for: (A) CSOs, (B) independent trade unions, (C) media.

SOURCE:

Column (A): Mission-level R4s and project reports
Column (B): AFL/CIO/ACILS reports; DOS Human Rights Report, and reports from HR organizations (Asia Watch, Amnesty International), ILO and ICFTU
Column (C): Contractor, mission/USIA.

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Laws and/or policies formulated and implemented by governmental institutions.

COMMENTS:

Column (A): 11 countries are targeted for expansion of the enabling environment for NGOs at the national and local levels. This will include several countries in CEE and the NIS, Egypt, one to two countries in Central America, and several countries in Africa.

Column (B): As identified by ACILS' regional reports, 18 countries (of 30 supported by the ACILS grant) are targeted for expansion of the enabling environment for national and local trade unions. These include: Indonesia, Bangladesh, Angola, Benin, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Eritrea, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe, Paraguay, Peru, Ecuador, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua. Priority countries for FY 97-98 are Chile, Eritrea, Bangladesh, and Indonesia.

Column (C): No targets at this time. Through the civil society IQC, World Learning Inc. will undertake a survey of issues and country target opportunities with respect to future investments in media

YEAR	PLANNED			ACTUAL		
	A	B	C	A	B	C
97	1	3	—			
98	3	6	—			
99	5	9	—			
00	8	12	—			
01	11	15	—			
02	11	18	—			

AGENCY OBJECTIVE 2.3:

Increased development of a politically active civil society.

**SSO 3 CIVIL SOCIETY:**

Informed citizens' groups effectively contribute to more responsive government.

Approved: June 1997 **Organization:** G/DG**INDICATOR 3.2:**Countries where citizen groups advocate policy reforms.
(Advocacy)**UNIT OF MEASURE:** Number of countries where (A) CSOs, (B) independent trade unions, or (C) media are advocating policy reforms.**SOURCE:**

Column (A): Mission R4s and project reports.

Column (B): AFL/CIO/ACILS reports; DOS HR report.

Column (C): TBD.

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Advocacy campaigns undertaken by civic organizations, including CSOs and independent trade unions.**COMMENTS:**

Column (A): Five countries in their respective order of priority are targeted: Egypt, El Salvador, Angola, Mali, and Guatemala.

Column (B): 28 countries are targeted by ACILS regional reports: Bangladesh, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Philippines, Algeria, Angola, Benin, Cote D'Ivoire, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Brazil, Paraguay, Guatemala, Honduras, Dominican Republic, Panama, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Ecuador, and Peru. Priority countries for FY 97 and 98 are Brazil, Ghana, Sri Lanka, and the Philippines.

Column (C) No targets at this time. Through the civil society IQC, World Learning Inc. will undertake a survey of issues and country target opportunities with respect to future investments in media.

YEAR	PLANNED			ACTUAL		
	A	B	C	A	B	C
97	1	5	__			
98	3	10	__			
99	4	15	__			
00	5	20	__			
01	5	25	__			
02	5	28	__			

AGENCY OBJECTIVE 2.3:

Increased development of a politically active civil society.

**SSO 3 CIVIL SOCIETY:**

Informed citizens' groups effectively contribute to more responsive government.

Approved: June 1997 **Organization:** G/DG**INDICATOR 3.3:**Countries with citizens groups demonstrating greater influence on government decisions.
(Impact)**UNIT OF MEASURE:** Number of countries where (A) CSOs or (B) independent trade unions have an influence on government decisions.**SOURCE:**

Column (A): Mission and project reports.

Column (B): AFL/CIO/ACILS reports.

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Number of governments effecting decisions consistent with CSO and labor union advocacy objectives.**COMMENTS:**

Column (A): 5 countries are targeted for achieving this objective. These include Egypt, El Salvador, Angola, Mali and Guatemala.

Column (B): 28 countries are targeted by ACILS regional reports: Bangladesh, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Philippines, Algeria, Angola, Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Brazil, Paraguay, Guatemala, Honduras, Dominican Republic, Panama, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Ecuador, and Peru. Priority countries for FY 97 and 98 are the Dominican Republic, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and the Philippines.

YEAR	PLANNED		ACTUAL	
	A	B	A	B
97	1	5		
98	2	10		
99	3	15		
00	4	20		
01	5	25		
02	5	28		

Performance Data Sheets: Civil Society IRs and Indicators

SSO 3 CIVIL SOCIETY:

Informed citizens' groups effectively contribute to more responsive government.



Approved: June 1997 **Organization:** G/DG

INTERMEDIATE RESULT 3.1:

Civil society program guidelines developed and applied.

INDICATOR 3.1:

Missions using civil society program guidelines.

UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of missions.

SOURCE: Mission and project reports.

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Mission adopting guidelines.

COMMENTS: Guidelines for advocacy, civic education, civil society strategies and media will be developed by two contractors in the two civil society IQCs in FY 97-98, and will be based on a review of project experience of AID and other donors. The guidelines will be disseminated in FY 98. Priority countries for adoption of the guidelines in their respective order are Egypt, Mali, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Benin, Ghana, Angola, and Peru.

YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
97	N.A.	
98	1	
99	3	
00	5	
01	7	
02	10	

SSO 3 CIVIL SOCIETY:

Informed citizens' groups effectively contribute to more responsive government.

**INTERMEDIATE RESULT 3.2:**

Selected unions strengthened.

Approved: June 1997 **Organization:** G/DG

INDICATOR 3.2:

Countries with unions better organized.

UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of countries where unions are better organized.

SOURCE: AFL/CIO/ACILS and mission reports.

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Better organized and fully functioning union organizations.

COMMENTS: Trade union organizations in 28 countries will be targeted for technical assistance by ACILS. These constitute approximately one-fourth of existing trade unions organizations affiliated with local confederations and federations with ties to the AFL-CIO and other international trade union bodies which provide them with assistance as necessary. Selected countries include: Bangladesh, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Philippines, Algeria, Angola, Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Brazil, Paraguay, Guatemala, Honduras, Dominican Republic, Panama, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Ecuador, and Peru. Priority countries for FY 97 and 98 are Honduras, Algeria, Tanzania, and Bangladesh.

YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
97	5	
98	10	
99	15	
00	20	
01	25	
02	28	

SSO 3 CIVIL SOCIETY:

Informed citizens' groups effectively contribute to more responsive government.



Approved: June 1997 **Organization:** G/DG

INTERMEDIATE RESULT 3.3:

USAID methodology for strengthening of civic-oriented NGOs developed and applied.

INDICATOR 3.3:

Missions using USAID methodology to strengthen civic-oriented NGOs.

UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of missions. SOURCE: Mission and project reports. INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Number of missions which have used USAID methodology to strengthen civic-oriented NGOs. COMMENTS: Candidate missions include those in Egypt, El Salvador, Angola, Mali, Guatemala, Bangladesh and the Philippines. Two to three NGOs per country could be expected to be targeted. Implementing partners will include the civil society IQC mechanisms and other contractors.	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
	97	2	
	98	4	
	99	7	
	00	10	
	01	12	
	02	14	

Performance Data Sheets: Governance



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Performance Data Sheets: Governance SSOs and Indicators

AGENCY OBJECTIVE 2.4:

More transparent & accountable government institutions.



SSO 4 GOVERNANCE:

National and local government institutions more openly and effectively perform their public responsibilities.

Approved: June 1997 **Organization:** G/DG

INDICATOR 4.1:

Governments articulate and sponsor anti-corruption measures.

(Governmental Integrity)

UNIT OF MEASURE:

Number of selected governments.

SOURCE:

Review of mission R4s, IQC/grantee reports, and mission contacts.

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION:

A mission's definition of whether or not a government has articulated and sponsored anti-corruption measures, in consultation with G/DG's IQCs/grantee, will determine whether the target has been attained.

COMMENTS:

As of 1997, Transparency International (TI) is G/DG's principal partner in the area of governmental integrity. TI's overall goal is to curb corruption through international and national coalitions which encourage governments to establish and implement laws, policies, and anti-corruption programs. Critical to this strategy is the strengthening of public support for anti-corruption programs. In 1997, Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI) is reviewing models being used to address corruption (to include descriptions of strengths and weaknesses in different contexts). Missions and bureaus may add funds to the TI grant, buy-in to the DAI IQC, or receive assistance from G/DG through these procurement mechanisms to develop anti-corruption activities.

In 1997, TI will begin "Phase One" of its four-year program, during which it will sponsor up to five regional workshops in collaboration with the World Bank and other partners to address corruption-related subjects of particular priority in each region (e.g., campaign financing in the LAC region or reduction of corruption in privatization programs in the ENI region). The regional workshops will serve as a first screening for candidate countries for special attention.

In 1998, TI will begin "Phase Two," during which it will (along with USAID) select up to eight countries for inclusion in a "Special Integrity Program." The goal is to select two countries from each region. Possible targets include: Uganda, Tanzania, South Africa, Bangladesh, India, Hungary, Nicaragua, and Argentina. In Phase Two of its program, TI will concentrate efforts at the country level and will strive for the creation/implementation of practical programs of reform. G/DG will survey USAID Missions globally for expressions of interest for inclusion in the "Special Integrity Program."

Measurable results are anticipated in years 1999-2002 (see table). Results are cumulative over the multi-year period.

YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
97	0	
98	1	
99	2	
00	4	
01	6	
02	8	

AGENCY OBJECTIVE 2.4:

More transparent & accountable government institutions.

**SSO 4 GOVERNANCE:**

National and local government institutions more openly and effectively perform their public responsibilities.

Approved: June 1997 **Organization:** G/DG**INDICATOR 4.2:**Local-level governments improve democratic processes.
(*Democratic Decentralization*)**UNIT OF MEASURE:**

Number of selected missions with Center-assistance governance programs.

SOURCE:

Direct survey of mission contacts, mission R4s, IQC/grantee reports.

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION:

Use mission's definition of indicators.

COMMENTS:

Democratic decentralization is a complicated set of activities that often requires interplay between and among several sectors (most notably the economic sector), constitutional and political reform, elections, and a favorable enabling environment for success. Special effort will be made to identify and work with USAID countries where significant indigenous political will exists.

In 1997, G/DG's principal partner in the area of democratic decentralization is the Research Triangle Institute (RTI), Center for International Development. G/DG awarded RTI an IQC, one objective of which is to increase local participation in all levels of government and to assist local government to serve as a balance/counterbalance to central state authorities. On the heels of the seminal research conducted in 1996, RTI is carrying out an iterative dialogue in three regions to further deepen understanding and to develop a best practices and lessons learned guide related to incentives that promote democratic practices through decentralization.

In 1997, workshops will be carried out in Croatia, West Africa (including five countries), and Paraguay. The workshops' proceedings will be synthesized into a practical decentralization guide and disseminated globally. The Center will survey mission interest in receiving TA for redesign of local government initiatives within the context of the "best practice" guidelines and review relevant documents for global analysis of local government programming. The governance team will identify at least one USAID country per region for extensive consultation and a follow-up workshop or technical assistance in FY 98, and at least one country for special assistance each following year.

Results are cumulative over the multi-year period.

YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
97	N.A.	
98	N.A.	
99	1	
00	2	
01	3	
02	4	

AGENCY OBJECTIVE 2.4:

More transparent & accountable government institutions

**SSO 4 GOVERNANCE:**

National and local government institutions more openly and effectively perform their public responsibilities.

Approved: June 1997 **Organization:** G/DG**INDICATOR 4.3:**Legislative bodies improve their effectiveness and accountability.
(*Legislative Strengthening*)**UNIT OF MEASURE:**

Number of selected countries.

SOURCE:

Direct survey of mission contacts, mission R4s, IQC/grantee reports.

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION:

Use mission's definition of indicators.

COMMENTS:

In 1997, G/DG's principal partner in this area is the Office of International Programs of the State University of New York (SUNY/OIP). G/DG awarded SUNY/OIP an IQC to provide services to strengthen deliberative bodies by improving their capacity, performance, oversight, and representative functions. G/DG collaborated with USAID/Bolivia to sponsor a conference on legislative modernization in Bolivia. Working with SUNY/OIP, G/DG has prepared a conference report featuring best practices for legislative strengthening initiatives. Information on USAID and others' legislative strengthening activities--past and present--is being aggregated and analyzed. A bibliography on legislative strengthening is being developed. This information and results of a CDIE legislative strengthening study and of the desk studies described in the following paragraph will be aggregated into one document in FY 97 as legislative strengthening guidance.

Desk Studies on Legislative Accountability: Desk studies are being prepared specifically related to: a) methods for increasing (post-election) interaction between constituents and their representatives; b) ways of increasing public debate in the legislature; c) structure for achieving better balance in the separation of powers; d) standardization of procedures for professionalizing the management of legislatures; e) influences of party and election configuration on accountability/responsiveness and independence/authority of legislatures.

Legislative Strengthening Strategy--Generic Example: G/DG will work with a mission that either has or is developing a DG strategic objective related to strengthening of the legislature to develop objectives, indicators, and targets which can serve as a generic example for other countries.

Field Test Guidance: Disseminate, field test and obtain feedback on legislative strengthening guidance which will be drafted in FY 97, with particular attention to alternatives showing most promise at different stages of political transition.

Local Legislative Bodies: Collaborate with missions providing assistance for decentralization to assess what type of support to strengthen local legislative bodies is important, and at what stage.

G/DG anticipates that legislative bodies in five selected countries will have improved their effectiveness and accountability by the year 2002. While these countries have not yet been identified, it is anticipated that at least one country will be selected from each region: AFR, ANE, ENI, and LAC. Results are cumulative over the multi-year period.

YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
97	N.A.	
98	1	
99	2	
00	3	
01	4	
02	5	

AGENCY OBJECTIVE 2.4:

More transparent & accountable government institutions.

**SSO 4 GOVERNANCE:**

National and local government institutions more openly and effectively perform their public responsibilities.

Approved: June 1997 **Organization:** G/DG

INDICATOR 4.4:

Countries progress toward effective civilian control over the national military.
(Civil-Military)

UNIT OF MEASURE:

Number of countries.

SOURCE:

Direct survey of mission contacts, mission R4s, IQC/grantee reports.

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION:

Use mission's definition of indicators.

COMMENTS:

The first step (within this priority area) is the distribution of a Request for Applications (RFA) for Global Civil-Military Relations. G/DG anticipates that a cooperative agreement will be awarded by September 1997.

According to G/DG's planned results, three countries will be targeted for progress toward effective civilian control over the national military by the year 2002. The grantee will be expected to select the three targeted countries during the first year of the grant period.

Results are cumulative over the multi-year period.

YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
97	N.A.	
98	N.A.	
99	N.A.	
00	1	
01	2	
02	3	

AGENCY OBJECTIVE 2.4:

More transparent & accountable government institutions.

**SSO 4 GOVERNANCE:**

National and local government institutions more openly and effectively perform their public responsibilities.

Approved: June 1997 **Organization:** G/DG

INDICATOR 4.5:

Countries effectively manage conflict and policy implementation.

(Conflict Mitigation)

UNIT OF MEASURE:

Number of countries.

SOURCE:

Direct survey of mission contacts, mission R4s, IQC/grantee reports.

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION:

Use of mission's definition of indicators.

COMMENTS:

As of 1997, G/DG's principal partner in policy implementation methodologies and in the conflict mitigation area is Management Systems International (MSI), through the Implementing Policy Change II (IPC II) project. MSI assists "stakeholders" to seek workable, problem-solving accommodations of interests and to coalesce the needed support for difficult change. In addition to IPC II, the Center is working along with Search for Common Ground, Partners for Democratic Change, and Harvard's Conflict Management Group to develop practical guidelines on the use of conflict resolution tools such as mediation, arbitration, collaborative problem-solving, community mediation, etc., to broaden understanding and use of conflict resolution tools in development sectors where implementation of specific policies are hampered by conflict (e.g., USAID's Greater Horn of Africa Initiative).

Results are cumulative over the multi-year period.

YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
97	N.A.	
98	N.A.	
99	2	
00	3	
01	4	
02	5	

Performance Data Sheets: Governance

Intermediate Results and Indicators

SSO 4 GOVERNANCE:

National and local government institutions more openly and effectively perform their public responsibilities.



Approved: June 1997 **Organization:** G/DG

INTERMEDIATE RESULT 4.1:

Anti-corruption models developed and applied.

INDICATOR 4.1:

Missions using approaches for anti-corruption objectives.

UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of missions.

SOURCE:

Mission reports and other contractors and grantees.

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Methodologies developed by Center staff working in cooperation with the Center's contractors and grantees. Currently, work is underway to review and develop successful models for fighting corruption. This study along with other workshops and meetings will be synthesized into a "practical guidebook" and disseminated globally.

COMMENTS:

Critical to this strategy is the strengthening of public support for anti-corruption programs. In addition to G/DG core support for TI, missions and bureaus have added funds on to the grant. G/DG will track bureau and mission support for the grant.

Models will be finalized in 1997, drawing on field work in three to four countries. Targeted are: Sierra Leone, Ukraine, Tanzania, and Cambodia. Guidance will be pilot-tested in two to four countries in 1998. A gradual increase in countries using the models is anticipated. G/DG will provide advice and guidance to countries using models.

Results are cumulative over the multi-year period.

YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
97	0	
98	2	
99	4	
00	6	
01	8	
02	10	

SSO 4 GOVERNANCE:

National and local government institutions more openly and effectively perform their public responsibilities.



Approved: June 1997 **Organization:** G/DG

INTERMEDIATE RESULT 4.2:

Prototype strategies for effecting democratic decentralization developed and applied.

INDICATOR 4.2:

Missions using democratic decentralization prototypes.

UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of missions. SOURCE: IQC/grantee reports and direct mission contacts. INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Number of missions using democratic decentralization prototypes developed by the Center. COMMENTS: Expressions of interest will be sought through survey and direct mission contact. Mission R4 and Strategic Plan Reviews, as well as Regional Bureau input, will be sought to build interest and understanding of new methodologies and approaches. Models will be finalized in 1997. Countries expected to participate are Paraguay and Croatia. Guidance will be pilot-tested in selected countries in 1998. A gradual increase in the countries using the models is anticipated. G/DG will provide advice and guidance to countries using models.	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
	97	0	
	98	2	
	99	5	
	00	8	
	01	12	
	02	15	

SSO 4 GOVERNANCE:

National and local government institutions more openly and effectively perform their public responsibilities.



Approved: June 1997 **Organization:** G/DG

INTERMEDIATE RESULT 4.3:

Legislative strengthening models and guidelines developed and applied.

INDICATOR 4.3:

Missions using legislative strengthening models and guidelines.

UNIT OF MEASURE:

Number of missions.

SOURCE:

IQC/grantee reports and direct mission contacts.

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Number of missions using legislative strengthening models and guidelines developed by the Center.

COMMENTS:

Expressions of interest will be sought through survey and direct mission contact. Mission R4 and Strategic Plan reviews, as well as Regional Bureau input, will be sought to build interest and understanding of new methodologies and approaches.

Models will be finalized in 1997. Guidance will be pilot-tested in selected countries in 1998. A gradual increase in the countries using the models is anticipated. G/DG will provide advice and guidance to countries using models.

Results are cumulative over the multi-year period.

YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
97	N.A.	
98	2	
99	5	
00	6	
01	8	
02	10	

SSO 4 GOVERNANCE:

National and local government institutions more openly and effectively perform their public responsibilities.



Approved: June 1997 **Organization:** G/DG

INTERMEDIATE RESULT 4.4:

Model methodologies for anticipating and managing change and conflicts affecting governance developed and applied.

INDICATOR 4.4:

Mission programs using conflict mitigation and policy change models.

UNIT OF MEASURE:

Number of missions.

SOURCE:

IQC/grantee reports and direct mission contacts.

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Number of missions using conflict mitigation and policy change models developed by the Center.

COMMENTS:

As of 1997, G/DG's principal partner in policy implementation methodologies and the conflict mitigation area is Management Systems International (MSI), through the Implementing Policy Change II (IPC II) project. MSI assists "stakeholders" to a program or national change to seek workable, problem-solving accommodations of interests and to coalesce the needed support for difficult change. In addition to IPC II, the Center is looking to develop other mediation and arbitration mechanisms where implementation of specific policies are not the issue (e.g., USAID's Greater Horn of Africa Initiative).

Results are cumulative over the multi-year period.

Expressions of interest will be sought through survey and direct mission contact. Mission R4 and Strategic Plan Reviews, as well as Regional Bureau input, will be sought to build interest and understanding of new methodologies and approaches.

Models will be finalized in 1997. Countries expected to participate are Egypt and Bulgaria. Guidance will be pilot-tested in selected countries in 1998. A gradual increase in the countries using the models is anticipated. G/DG will provide advice and guidance to countries using models.

YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
97	2	
98	4	
99	6	
00	8	
01	9	
02	10	

SSO 4 GOVERNANCE:

National and local government institutions more openly and effectively perform their public responsibilities.



Approved: June 1997 **Organization:** G/DG

INTERMEDIATE RESULT 4.5

Model methodologies for promoting civil-military relations at different stages of political transition are developed and applied.

INDICATOR 4.5:

Mission using model methodologies for promoting civil-military relations.

UNIT OF MEASURE:

Number of missions.

SOURCE:

IQC/grantee reports and direct mission contacts.

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Number of missions using Center-developed model methodologies for promoting civil-military relations.

COMMENTS:

Missions' expressions of interest in G/DG services will be sought through surveys and direct mission contact. Mission R4 and Strategic Plan Reviews, as well as Regional Bureau input, will be sought to build interest and understanding of new methodologies and approaches among missions.

Results are cumulative over the multi-year period.

YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
97	N.A.	
98	N.A.	
99	1	
00	3	
01	5	
02	5	



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